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Abstract This study uses a county-level difference-in-difference framework to esti-
mate the share of re-enrollment into the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in re-
sponse to local ethanol production capacity after the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS).
Relatively more land remained in CRP in ethanol-intensive areas after the RFS. This
seemingly counter-intuitive result can be explained by post-RFS changes to the CRP
that favored ethanol-intensive areas. Both CRP design changes and production trends
correlated with ethanol plant location pose challenges for empirical strategies that use
ethanol plant location to study production or land use decisions. Changes to CRP poli-
cies can play an important role in participation and land use decisions.
Key words: Conservation Reserve Program, Renewable Fuel Standard,
Ethanol.
JEL codes: Q15, Q18, Q28.
Ethanol production in the United States has seen about a four-fold increase
under the Federal Renewal Fuel Standard (RFS), which was first enacted in
2005 and subsequently revised in 2007. The 2007 revision mandates an annual
consumption of 15 billion gallons of ethanol by 2015, eventually increasing to
36 billion gallons by 2022 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2016). The
period beginning 2008 through the present has also seen an enrollment de-
cline in the U.S. Federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) by about 10
million acres (USDA Economic Research Service 2015) from a peak of nearly
37 million acres in 2007 (Stubbs 2014). The CRP is a voluntary federal pro-
gram that offers farmers the option of retiring environmentally sensitive tracts
of farmland that are currently in production in lieu of an annual rental
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payment. The contract period for enrollment is generally 10 years. During
periods of high crop prices, land expiring from the CRP would be subject to
reversion to crop production.Hendricks and Er (2018) suggest that CRP land
was a prominent factor in land use change during the recent period of high
commodity prices.
This study examines the relationship between ethanol plant location and
CRP re-enrollment after the ethanol mandate. Understanding the effect of
ethanol mandates on CRP enrollment is important for a few reasons. First,
CRP provides important environmental services, which might be lost as
land returns to commercial crop production (Secchi and Babcock 2015).
Second, land under CRP contracts, together with pasture land, may serve as
the extensive margin for crop production. Expectations about commodity
prices affect land owners’ incentives to enroll, re-enroll or dis-enroll land un-
der the program. Third, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated
with (re)converting CRP to cropland might reduce the GHG benefits of
crop-based biofuels. Several studies have speculated that the emissions asso-
ciated with land cover change could render biofuel policies counterproduc-
tive to climate change mitigation (Fargione et al. 2008; Searchinger et al.
2008; Melillo et al. 2009; Hertel et al. 2010; Lapola et al. 2010).
The magnitude of land cover change and associated emissions in such
studies is wide-ranging. Predictions on the higher end are that about 500
acres of non-cropland would be converted to cropland per each million-
gallon increase in U.S. corn ethanol production (Searchinger et al. 2008;
USEPA 2010). On the other hand, Chen and Khanna (2018) estimate that
land use change as low as 112 acres being converted per million-gallon in-
crease in corn ethanol production during 2007-12. Being simulation-based,
the estimates of land cover change from all such studies mentioned above
are hypotheses that require empirical validation. Since crop prices that drive
agricultural land use are the product of multiple interacting demand and
supply shocks, only one of which is shifting biofuel demand, identifying the
causal effect of growth in biofuel production on land use change (LUC) is
challenging. Rising affluence, energy prices, adverse weather, and barriers
to trade are at least four other shocks to have contributed to high crop prices
during the last decade (Gilbert 2010).
High-resolution satellite images of agricultural land cover change for the
western corn belt (Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Nebraska) show a decline in total grassland area of more than half a million
acres between 2006 and 2011 (Wright and Wimberly 2013). This study, how-
ever, only establishes the overall correlation between high crop prices and
LUC, and not a causal effect of ethanol mandates on LUC. For instance, the
correlation between increase in the profitability of crop production and the
increase in crop-planted area in the prairie states suggests that cropland sup-
ply is inelastic (Barr et al. 2011). Specifically, Swinton et al. (2011) find that
between 2006 and 2009, when profitability of the typical farm increased
64%, crop-planted area increased only 2%. Overall, causal estimates of the
effect of biofuel policies on the encroachment of cropland into land set aside
for nature are lacking, which provided the motivation for this study.
There is a large body of literature on factors influencing CRP enrollment
decisions, optimal program design, rental rates, and several other issues. A lit-
erature review byWachenheim et al. (2014) emphasizes that the economics lit-
erature on CRP collectively indicates that landowners respond to financial
incentives, but are also influenced by both uncertainty related to program
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design and non-financial influences, such as preferences for the environmental
benefits provided by CRP. There is also a rich body of literature on the auctions
used for CRP enrollment and the potential for improvements (e.g.,Hellerstein
et al. 2015). Economists have also considered the implications of the post-2007
decline in total land enrolled in CRP (Wu and Weber, 2012). Jointly, several
studies support the economic and environmental benefits of the CRP as well as
the importance of considering factors beyond commodity prices.
Program changes occurring around the time of the mandate favored land
with smaller parcels or more environmental benefits. Typically a landowner
can sign up for CRP under one of two programs—general signup and
Continuous CRP (CCRP). While land enrolled in the 1990s would have been
through a general sign-up, in the 2000s different CRP programs, collectively
referred to as CCRP, allowed for smaller parcels with more demonstrated
environmental benefits to automatically enter CRP (Stubbs 2014). General
sign-ups take place during fixed periods and involve competitive bidding
by landowners. The USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA), which administers
CRP, accepts bids after ranking them on environmental benefits and cost. In
contrast, smaller parcels may be enrolled under the CCRP at any time with-
out bidding or ranking, so long as the landowners undertake specified land
management practices and the land meets certain eligibility criteria based
on its environmental characteristics. CCRP was becoming more prominent
during the mid 2000s and may have facilitated re-enrollment. Temporary ex-
tension or re-enrollment (REX) contracts were also broadly offered in the
late 2000s for expiring contracts on more environmentally sensitive land, or
land with a higher Environmental Benefits Index (EBI; Farm Service
Agency). Decreases in the acreage cap post-mandate may also have played
a role in the national decline in CRP acreage (Hendricks and Er 2018).
Several studies have used ethanol plant location to estimate the impact of
ethanol production and related policies on a variety of outcomes related to
crop production, including farmland value and land rents (Henderson and
Gloy 2009; Blomendahl et al. 2011; Towe and Tra 2013; Kropp and Peckham
2015), local grain price (McNew and Griffith 2005), farm size (Tra and Towe
2016), various measures of land use such as area planted to corn, total agricul-
tural area, intensification, and effect of corn-soy rotation (Miao 2013; Arora
et al. 2016; Motamed et al. 2016), and landowners’ decision to exit early from
CRP and return to farming (Krumel Jr. et al. 2015). By decreasing the local ba-
sis, or transportation costs to deliver crops to market, ethanol plants make lo-
cal crop production more profitable. Beyond changes to the local basis,
ethanol plants may even improve local expectations for future farm income
(Towe and Tra 2013).
There is a growing body of research that shows that ethanol production is
associated with local intensification of corn production as well as more land
coming into production (Brown et al. 2014; Motamed et al. 2016). Using a
county-fixed effects model, we extend this literature to consider the impact
of ethanol plant capacity on local CRP enrollment decisions. We find that a
larger share of land re-enrolled in CRP in counties with growing ethanol ca-
pacity after the biofuel mandate went into effect. This result, however,
should not be interpreted as implying that the mandate itself led to less land
leaving the CRP, as it only holds for counties with land more likely to be af-
fected by post-mandate CRP changes. Overall, our results suggest that land
that exited CRP was not necessarily driven by proximity of an ethanol plant,
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but that CRP design changes effectively served to keep relatively more land
enrolled near ethanol plants.
Data
Our study focuses on ten Midwestern states—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin—which together consistently account for the vast majority of U.S.
ethanol production. Our data spans the years 1999 through 2014. Since these
states are also among the largest corn-growing states, this indicates that prox-
imity to sources of feedstock is a major factor in ethanol plant siting decisions.
We combine several sources of county-level data for our analysis. The lo-
cation, company name, feedstock, and total plant capacity are reported by
the Renewable Fuels Association. There are 199 ethanol plants accounted for
in our data set, with 40 in operation in 1999, 71 in 2005, 100 in 2007, and 182
by 2014. Ethanol capacity is measured by millions of gallons per year
(mgpy). The latitude and longitude of each plant location is calculated as
the centroid of the city in which it operates, as reported by Google Maps.
Each city is then matched with the county in which it is located. The dis-
tance between each county’s centroid and the nearest ethanol plant (in oper-
ation) is determined using the GEODIST package in Stata. We use capacity
of ethanol plants within an 18.5-mile and 31-mile radius of each county cen-
troid (the 0.25 an 0.50 percentiles for distance to the nearest ethanol plant,
respectively), and estimate our empirical model under each specification.
This allows us flexibility in considering differences in local transportation in-
frastructure, which would affect transportation costs and production deci-
sions. While we only report results using the 18.5-mile radius, results with
the 31-mile radius are consistent and available upon request.
We use county-level data on CRP enrollment, broken down into details of
acres expiring, acres re-enrolling, and new acres entering the program, as
well as the total stock of acres enrolled and CRP rental payments. CRP
rental payments form the base of payments to landowners, and allow for
payments to adjust upwards based on market conditions and compete with
local cropland rental rates. This data is collected by the USDA Farm Service
Agency (FSA) and county-level aggregates are estimated by the USDA
Economic Research Service (ERS). CRP contracts are typically ten years, al-
though the length of the contracts varies with contract type and has changed
across Farm Acts. We are specifically interested in re-enrollment of land that
expires, as enrollment decisions are from over a decade ago. Most land ex-
piring during our study period would have been from land enrolled under
a general or competitive sign-up.
We obtained data on average county-level CRP parcel size and soil qual-
ity to allow us to consider the impact of program changes on re-enrollment
decisions. We also use NASS data on state corn prices and county-level cash
rents. To compare our analysis with that of related studies, we also include
measures of the intensive and extensive margins of corn production: (a)
acres of corn planted as a share of total acres of corn and soy planted, and
(b) total corn acres planted. This county-level data on corn and soybean pro-
duction is reported annually.
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in table 1. A map of etha-
nol plants and CRP acreage in 2007 is reported in figure 1. As discussed pre-
viously, there was a great deal of variation in both CRP enrollment and
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ethanol plant numbers and capacity over our study period. Data for coun-
ties with and without an ethanol plant reported in table 1 indicate substan-
tial differences, which informs our empirical strategy.
Empirical Strategy
We investigate the effect of the federal biofuel mandate on land use
change by estimating the effect of changes to local ethanol capacity on CRP
re-enrollment decisions. We argue that while federal biofuel policies might
have contributed to higher global commodity prices, the presence of an eth-
anol plant, as a local demand shifter, introduced spatial variation in crop
prices and land value. This variation can be attributed to the local ethanol
plant, while price shocks reflect broader economic conditions and other
Figure 1 Ethanol plants and CRP acres, 2007
Table 1 Summary Statistics, County-level Averages
Ethanol Cap.>0 Ethanol Cap.50
Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Ethanol Capacity (mgpy, w/in 18.5 miles) 72.2 70.1 0.00 0.00
CRP Acres (total) 17,008 17,864 22,258 25,009
CRP Acres (ﬁrst time enrollment) 601 481 783 1,232
Average Farm Size (acres in operation) 411 180 466 359
Median Farm Size (acres in operation) 180 89 195 178
CRP Rent Per Acre (USD) 97.4 32.2 76.4 31.0
Share of CRP Acres Re-Enrolled 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.56
Corn Intensity 0.62 0.10 0.57 0.16
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demand shifters. Ethanol plants introduce this variation by reducing the cost
of transporting the crop to market (often referred to as the basis), as opposed
to broader changes in price, which are driven by many factors and benefit all
producers. The presence of an ethanol plant may also have an impact beyond
improvement in the local basis, which Towe and Tra (2013) identify and refer
to as “vegetable spirits”—the effect that cannot be explained by these eco-
nomic fundamentals. Regardless of the mechanism, the location of an ethanol
plant has been shown to be related to local production decisions (i.e., (Miao
2013; Fatal and Thurman 2014; Motamed et al. 2016)) and is hence a poten-
tially useful tool to isolate the impact of the ethanol mandate. This includes
several periods, 1997–2009 (Miao 2013), 2006–2010 (Motamed et al. 2016), and
2002–2008 (Fatal and Thurman 2014), where ethanol plant location has been
shown to be related to larger corn production.
One plausible hypothesis is that counties with higher ethanol production
capacity are likely to see a relatively smaller share of land re-enroll in CRP.
However, ethanol plant location is unlikely to be randomly assigned. Instead,
ethanol plants are likely located in counties that provide easy and low cost ac-
cess to feedstock, that is, corn in the case of the Midwestern United States
(Low and Isserman 2009; Motamed et al. 2016). To minimize the cost of trans-
porting feedstock from the farm gate to the ethanol plant, plants might locate
in counties with higher-quality cropland or superior access to transportation
networks. If such counties have CRP land that is higher quality than average,
then such counties may experience a greater decline in the share of farmland
under CRP than counties with lower-quality CRP land. However, given that
the post-mandate crop price shock fundamentally altered production incen-
tives, the impact of the RFS on CRP enrollment is an empirical question.
In the literature, the endogeneity of plant-siting decisions is typically con-
trolled for by using a combination of fixed effects, matching estimators, and
instrumental variables. Towe and Tra (2013) use an increase in ethanol plant
capacity within a given vicinity of a parcel of farmland to identify the
capitalization effect of the RFS’s 2005 mandate. These authors use a
difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimator to control for
the non-random selection of ethanol production facilities; they find that the
addition of new ethanol capacity had a significant positive effect on farm-
land value post-RFS, but not so prior to the RFS. However, these authors
use parcel-level data, while we only have access to county-level data.
Krumel Jr. et al. (2015) estimate the impact of ethanol plant location on farm-
ers’ decision to exit the CRP before contract expiration from 2007 to 2013.
While most land only leaves the program upon expiration, a small share of
contracts left the program early and repaid all past CRP payments during
this period of high commodity prices. Krumel Jr. et al. (2015) find a signifi-
cant positive effect of ethanol plants driving early exit from the CRP, sug-
gesting an important role of ethanol plants on land use decisions. However,
these authors do not consider exits before and after the ethanol mandate.
Similar to (Krumel Jr. et al. 2015) and others, we attempt to control for the
plausible non-randomness of ethanol plant location through county fixed
effects. County fixed effects control for time-invariant factors that would
have been major drivers of location decisions throughout the study period
that may also affect CRP enrollment decisions, including soil productivity
and transportation networks. Fixed effects would also control for the aver-
age levels of environmentally sensitive land. We further use year fixed
effects to control for common factors affecting all counties over time,
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
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including commodity price trends. After estimating our main specification,
we conduct robustness tests to see if local price shifts that violate this im-
plicit “one price” assumption could be biasing our results.
Given that CRP acreage varies widely by county as well as by county
size, we use a scale-independent measure of CRP enrollment. Our depen-
dent variable (CRP) is measured as the share of expiring CRP acres from the
previous year that re-enrolled in the CRP program. Use of expiring acres
also improves our identification, as land that went into CRP ten or more
years ago would arguably be based on decisions unrelated to current market
conditions, ethanol plant location, etc. Further, using a relative measure mit-
igates any concerns about annual variation in number of acres expiring.
Our basic reduced-form estimating equations are (one each for the 2007
and 2005 versions of the RFS), for county i in year t:
CRPit ¼ d1ECit þ d2ECitD2007 þ bXit þ fi þ st þ it (1)
and
CRPit ¼ d1ECit þ d2ECitD2005 þ bXit þ fi þ st þ it (2)
where CRPit indicates the share of expired acres from year t – 1 that were re-
enrolled in year t. Ethanol capacity is indicated by ECit and various time-
variant controls by Xit, which includes county population, oil production,
and natural gas production. The binary variables D2005 and D2007 take the
value 1 in the years following 2005 and 2007, respectively. The interaction
terms ECitD2005 and ECitD2007 represent ethanol capacity post-RFS. We are
interested in d2, which represents the impact of ethanol capacity on CRP af-
ter the mandate went into effect relative to pre-mandate. County and year
fixed effects are denoted by fi and st, respectively. Unobserved variation is
denoted by the error term, it. For robustness we consider a few other de-
pendent variables under the same specification, specifically new acres enter-
ing CRP, total CRP acreage, and CRP rental payments.
Our empirical approach only controls for endogeneity of ethanol plant loca-
tion under the strong assumption that counties with an ethanol plant are not
experiencing differential time trends that are also correlated with CRP partici-
pation decisions and ethanol production. Basically, if ethanol-intensive coun-
ties were experiencing different rates of change in the dependent variables
that are potentially correlated with ethanol plant location, our results may be
biased. Many factors that drive these decisions are fixed, such as soil quality
and transportation networks, and hence captured by our county fixed effects.
Year effects capture the general commodity price environment, but may not
capture local basis shifts, which will be explored in our robustness checks.
The presence of unobserved trends that potentially bias results is a com-
mon issue when using a difference-in-difference approach, often referred to
as the “parallel trends assumption.” Many approaches are used to test for
parallel trends. The approach we use is to estimate a pre-mandate (before
2005) county-level fixed effects model that allows for a time trend for coun-
ties with and without ethanol plants, Eit and NEit, 1 respectively.
1The dummy variable Eit (NEit) equals one (zero) in years when the county had positive (no) ethanol ca-
pacity, and zero (one) otherwise.
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CRPit ¼ b1Xit þ fi þ c1tEitt þ c2tNEitt þ it for each t < 2005 (3)
This approach allows us to isolate time trends independent of county av-
erage effects, which are absorbed in fi. We estimate this model for our main
dependent variable as well as other variables of interest (CRP re-enrollment,
new CRP acreage, total CRP acreage, CRP rental payments, corn share, and
corn acres). We test for c1t¼ c2t and also present c1t and c2t graphically for
key variables. Analysis of a broad range of variables allows us to consider
the general production and land use trends that might be related to CRP
decisions. For example, CRP land may be more likely to be converted to
crop production in areas with relatively rapid growth in corn production.
On the other hand, CRP land or programs may be different in terms of phys-
ical characteristics or program administration in ethanol production areas
and hence subject to different trends.
In addition to the analysis of pre-trends, we also examine how “post-
trends,” specifically CRP program changes, may have influenced post-
mandate re-enrollment decisions. Our main approach for doing this is to
consider how CRP parcel size and average soil quality influences our
results. Given that there is not much time variation in average parcel size
and that this is likely endogenous to re-enrollment levels, we do not include
this variable in our main specification. Instead, we split our sample based
on average 2007 CRP parcel size and re-estimate our main specification for
each group (below and above median 2007 CRP parcel size). While data on
the average environmental benefits score for CRP parcels is not available,
we proxy for this with average county-level soil quality, as measured by
NCCPI (National Commodity Crop Productivity Index, as estimated by the
USDA NRCS). To further consider how parcel size and soil quality affect en-
rollment decisions, we interact these measures to further split our sample. If
program changes were affecting our result, we would expect these results to
vary.
The other potential area of concern is that our model may be biased by
local price (basis) shifts that are not controlled for by year or time fixed
effects. While local basis shifts during our study period are largely attrib-
uted to ethanol plants (Hart 2015), we cannot disprove other local basis
shifts. While county-level price data is not readily available, there are sev-
eral ways to test for potential bias. First, we estimate our model “naively”
with state-level corn prices, which may capture broader trends at the state-
level that differed from national price shocks but may not be fully exoge-
nous. Next, we stratify our sample by the post-RFS “local basis shift,”
proxied by change in county-level cropland cash rents from 2008–2014;
2008 was the first year these rental rates were readily available. This allows
us to estimate our model in counties by the local level of price or profitabil-
ity changes. Finally, we estimate our main specification from 2006–2009
only. This approach allows us to look at a shorter time period, which may
be less likely to capture any local basis shifts, which, outside of ethanol
plants, were likely to either occur over a long period or be less likely to oc-
cur during a short period.
Consideration of key production decisions can inform the overall validity
or comparability of our empirical strategy by testing for results similar to re-
lated studies. Hence, we also estimate our model with two measures of key
land use decisions for corn production. The results may also shed light on
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the environment in which CRP enrollment decisions were made. First, we
consider corn acreage as a share of total corn and soybean acres, which pro-
vides a measure of intensification trends. We also look at the extensive mar-
gin by considering total acres of corn planted.
Results and Discussion
Results for our main specification, based on ethanol plants that are located
within an 18.5 mile radius of the county centroid, are reported in table 2. We
consider ethanol capacity and ethanol capacity squared throughout the en-
tire study period. Given the uncertainty associated with how markets
responded to RFS legislation passed in both 2005 and 2007, we consider
both years as plausible for when the policy became effective. Over the entire
period, on average, ethanol capacity generally did not have a statistically
significant relationship with CRP re-enrollment, as indicated by the mar-
ginal effect reported below table 2. However, under all specifications, rela-
tively more land re-enrolled in counties with higher ethanol production
after the RFS went into effect. This result implies that areas with larger etha-
nol capacity had more land re-enrolling in CRP after the mandate, relative
to before. In light of the overall trend of declining CRP participation during
the study period, the result may be more appropriately interpreted as rela-
tively less land leaving CRP in ethanol-intensive areas after the RFS went
into effect.
Table 2 Ethanol Capacity and CRP Re-enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables 2005 RFS 2005 RFS 2007 RFS 2007 RFS
Ethanol Capacity 8.47e-05 3.84e-05
(0.000537) (0.000448)
Post 2005*Ethanol Capacity 0.00113***
(0.000258)
Ethanol Cap. Squared 2.39e-06 2.29e-06*
(1.43e-06) (1.20e-06)
Post 2005*Ethanol
Cap. Squared
3.17e-06***
(3.93e-07)
Post 2007*Ethanol Capacity 0.00128***
(0.000352)
Post 2007*Ethanol
Cap. Squared
3.35e-06***
(6.33e-07)
Constant 0.638*** 0.643*** 0.639*** 0.644***
(0.0543) (0.0556) (0.0545) (0.0556)
Observations 7,966 7,966 7,966 7,966
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.072
Number of counties 840 840 840 840
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include county population, year ﬁxed effects and oil and gas production. The average marginal effect
of ethanol capacity is.000638, with a std. error of.000488 and p-value of 0.191. Asterisks indicate the fol-
lowing: ***¼ p<0.01, **¼ p<0.05, and *¼ p<0.1.
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The effect is statistically significant and economically meaningful. For a
county with an increase in 100 million gallons per year of ethanol capacity
(capacity ranged from zero to 477 million gallons per year, with an average
of 11 million gallons over the study period), we estimate that the land leav-
ing the CRP after 2007 was approximately 13 percentage points lower rela-
tive to a county whose ethanol capacity did not increase post-RFS. The
magnitude and level of statistical significance for 2005 is similar. This result
contradicts our original hypothesis that relatively more land would leave
the CRP program in ethanol-intensive areas.
We also consider the effect of ethanol capacity after the RFS on total CRP
enrollment and new land entering CRP, respectively. Our result for the im-
pact of post-RFS ethanol capacity on these measures, reported in online sup-
plementary appendix table A1, is consistent with the impact on re-
enrollment. We find that more total land remains in the CRP program in
ethanol-intensive areas after the mandate began, and the effect is statistically
significant at the 5% level for ethanol capacity. While the effect of total CRP
acreage is challenging to interpret given different counties’ sizes, programs
available, and CRP expiration dates, it does provide some evidence of an ab-
solute effect in addition to the “relative” impact on re-enrollment. That is, it
provides some evidence that the relationship between ethanol capacity and
CRP participation decisions does not exist only for relative measures. For
new land entering CRP, we note that, although not always statistically sig-
nificant, the coefficient on post-RFS ethanol capacity is negative across all
specifications, consistent with our original hypothesis. This may be related
to the costs associated with putting land back into production relative to
incentives for taking marginal land out of production. Overall, a very small
amount of new land came into CRP in the immediate years following 2005
or 2007.
There were several programmatic changes to CRP that were concurrent
with the mandate. While CRP enrollment was stable or increasing before
the mandate (USDA Economic Research Service 2015), after the mandate
crop prices drastically increased, fundamentally altering incentives to
keep land out of production. This structural shift in commodity markets
might have brought into play local factors correlated with ethanol plant
location, which were not as relevant as before the mandate, and hence not
captured in our county fixed effects. Next, we consider the role of CRP
policies in driving our main results and further test the robustness of our
results using several approaches. We also consider indicators of transac-
tions costs.
CRP Design Change Impacts
As discussed, continuous CRP as well as the REX program began or
were used more after the mandate came into effect. While local decisions
and average EBI for CRP are unobserved, parcel size is a well-known fac-
tor for eligibility for CCRP. Further, smaller parcels may be more likely
to have a higher EBI. To consider whether program changes are driving
our result, we separate our sample by median parcel size. We also use av-
erage soil quality as measured by NCCPI. As indicated in table 3, we are
able to replicate our result for counties with smaller parcel sizes, but not
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above-median parcel sizes. This result is only weakly statistically signifi-
cant in counties with higher soil quality but below median parcel size.
However, we also find that in counties with lower soil quality and lower
CRP parcel size, coefficients for both ethanol capacity and ethanol capac-
ity after 2007 are positively correlated with CRP re-enrollment with
higher levels of statistical significance. These joint indicators of CCRP
and REX suitability support a result driven by favorability for these pro-
grams being correlated with ethanol plant capacity. For areas with
above-median parcel size, there is no relationship regardless of soil qual-
ity. Jointly, these results suggest that post-mandate changes to CRP were
more important than the impact of local ethanol plants in driving the re-
enrollment decision.
Another concern with our results could be that they are driven by pro-
gram differences in ethanol and corn-intensive states such as Iowa and
Illinois. The strength of continuous CRP in individual states may have
been also relevant, as programs are run by local USDA offices and some-
times states are involved in cost-sharing.2 However, our findings are not
completely driven by Illinois and Iowa. As indicated in table 4, we see a
similar pattern in all other states as well: both groups saw statistically sig-
nificant higher levels of CRP re-enrollment after the mandate in areas of
high ethanol capacity. It is unlikely that the result is driven by institutional
factors specific to CCRP use in Iowa and Illinois.
Table 3 Ethanol Capacity and CCRP/REX Suitability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher soil quality Lower soil quality
Below
median
Above
median
Below
median
Above
median
Variables parcel size parcel size parcel size parcel size
Ethanol capacity 0.0116 0.000418 0.000750*** 0.00123
(0.00947) (0.00175) (0.000274) (0.00110)
Post 2007*Ethanol
Capacity
0.00657* 0.000323 0.000662** 0.00124
(0.00376) (0.00171) (0.000276) (0.00103)
Constant 0.0317 0.783*** 0.624*** 0.829***
(0.611) (0.0800) (0.0685) (0.0743)
Observations 1,011 2,468 3,114 1,373
R-squared 0.042 0.177 0.073 0.332
Number of counties 115 291 304 130
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include county population, year ﬁxed effects and oil and gas production. Asterisks denote the follow-
ing: ***¼ p<0.01, **¼ p<0.05, and *¼ p<0.1.
2In one study, Iowa was reported as having both the highest number of farms and acreage enrolled in the
continuous CRP program nationwide while Illinois had the 2nd and 5th highest levels, respectively
(National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition 2015). However, these two states ranked much lower in
terms of total CRP acreage in 2014, with Iowa at 6th overall and Illinois at 11th (Farm Service Agency
2016).
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Transaction Costs and Environmental Preferences Indicators
We discussed the main results with individuals involved in the operation
of the CRP program in Iowa, the number one corn-producing state in the
United States where several ethanol plants are located. These individuals
suggested that several factors largely related to the transaction costs of
returning CRP land to production could be at play. In this section we dis-
cuss these factors and compare indicators of transactions costs and environ-
mental preferences across counties with and without ethanol plants. While
this analysis is suggestive, it is largely consistent with analysis of CRP policy
changes and provides further evidence for whether local factors correlated
with ethanol plant location could have counteracted any local price increase
caused by ethanol plants.
We investigate the influence of transaction costs on re-enrollment, includ-
ing (a) the prevalence of non-operating landowners who would have addi-
tional transaction costs over owner-operators, namely to find and manage
new tenants; and (b) consistent with CCRP incentives and smaller tracts of
land which would be more costly to convert, such as land on which it is dif-
ficult to operate large machinery. We also consider evidence for whether
non-operating landowners may have had stronger preferences for environ-
mental services/benefits. We test for correlation between factors that may
have influenced landowner re-enrollment decisions and ethanol plant pres-
ence in table 5. We find evidence that landowners may have been more
likely to re-enroll land in CRP in ethanol-intensive areas. For consistency,
we focus on 2007 (an agricultural census year) in addition to 2008 (a presi-
dential election year).
Rented land was more prevalent in ethanol-intensive areas, as indicated
in table 5. A non-operating landowner considering whether or not to re-
enroll their land into the CRP would face higher transaction costs for bring-
ing land back into production, such as finding a tenant and negotiating lease
terms. Given the presence of more rented land in ethanol-intensive areas,
non-operating landowners may have decided that the transaction costs asso-
ciated with finding and maintaining a relationship with a tenant out-
weighed the increased rental income.
Table 4 Ethanol Capacity and CRP Re-enrollment by States
(1) (2)
Variables IL and IA All other states
Ethanol Capacity 0.000543* 0.00147
(0.000314) (0.00132)
Post 2007*Ethanol Capacity 0.000635*** 0.00224***
(0.000241) (0.000716)
Constant 0.655*** 0.609***
(0.0487) (0.0651)
Observations 2,083 5,883
R-squared 0.183 0.062
Number of counties 196 644
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include county population, year ﬁxed effects and oil and gas production. Asterisks denote the follow-
ing: ***¼ p<0.01, **¼ p<0.05, and *¼ p<0.1.
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Parcel size relates not only to ease of entry into continuous CRP but also
transaction costs associated with returning land to production. For example,
equipment might be more difficult or costly to operate on small or odd-
shaped parcels. We know ethanol plants tended to locate in counties with
lower levels of total land in CRP, illustrated clearly in the map in figure 1.
Counties with an ethanol plant in 2007 had an average parcel size more
than 10 acres smaller than in counties without an ethanol plant (table 5).
While average and median farm size are smaller in ethanol-intensive areas
(table 5), the relationship is only weakly statistically significant.
We use county-level voting in the 2008 presidential election as a proxy for
preferences for the environmental services or benefits provided by CRP.
While local environmental preferences are difficult to measure, political out-
comes are more widely available. While this is only a suggestive indicator,
in general Democratic candidates have a stronger platform on conservation.
We find higher levels of Democratic votes in the 2008 presidential election
(Democratic share) in counties with an ethanol plant (table 5). This result is
consistent with landowners in ethanol-intensive areas being more likely to
value the environmental benefits of CRP and re-enroll their land in the
program.
Higher transactions costs and preferences for environmental services com-
bined with higher suitability for CCRP and REX may have been mutually
reinforcing. A non-operating landowner with a small, odd-shaped parcel
that gained satisfaction from the environmental benefits of CRP in an area
with easier re-enrollment due to CCRP or REX, would have arguably had
much stronger incentives for re-enrollment land into CRP. From our analy-
sis, we know that many of these factors were more prevalent in ethanol-
intensive areas. This is consistent with other research that has shown that
transaction costs and program details play an important role in CRP partici-
pation decisions (Wachenheim et al. 2014). Our study confirms that these
features were an important factor even during the recent commodity boom,
which featured an extended period of historic levels of farm income.
Production Decisions and Pre-Trends
In this section we test the general validity and comparability of our ap-
proach by testing for pre-trends and implementing our model for dependent
variables used in other studies. In online supplementary appendix table A2,
we use corn intensification as the dependent variable. Specifically, we use
Table 5 Indicators of Transactions Costs and Environmental Preferences by Ethanol
Plant Presence
No Plant Plant T-test p-value Year
Average size of a CRP parcel (acres) 38.4 25.4 0.0001 2007
Shared rented farmland acres 0.44 0.56 0 2007
Average farm size (acres) 674 516 0.026 2007
Median farm size (acres) 289 226 0.073 2007
Share democrat votes 41.6% 43.9% 0.034 2008
Note: all variables are county-level.
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corn acres planted as a share of total corn and soybean acres planted to cap-
ture whether producers have shifted to more corn in their corn-soybean
rotations. Arora et al. (2016) find evidence of reduced corn-soy rotation in
the vicinity of ethanol plants in South Dakota. These effects of post-mandate
ethanol capacity on corn intensification are statistically significant at the 1%
level across most specifications. The magnitude is also economically signifi-
cant. A 100 million gallon increase in ethanol capacity would have been as-
sociated with a one-percentage point increase in the share of corn out of
total corn and soybean acres. This translates roughly into an additional
3,482 acres or 522,000 additional bushels of corn produced in 2008 if we as-
sume average yields of 150 bushels per acre. We report similar but weakly
statistically significant results for corn acres planted in online supplemen-
tary appendix table A3. These results for corn intensification and corn acre-
age confirm that our empirical strategy provides similar results to Motamed
et al. (2016) and other studies that consider ethanol plant location and corn
production. These findings also suggest that our results for CRP enrollment
were driven by factors different than those driving other production
decisions.
Consideration of pre-trends in CRP participation and corn production are
also critical to evaluating the robustness of our empirical strategy, which
makes strong identification assumptions. The year-ethanol plant coefficients
from equation 3 are estimated for all of our dependent variables and
reported for key variables in figure 2: the share of acres re-enrolled and
share of corn. The charts illustrate how there was no apparent difference in
trends for CRP re-enrollments, but pre-trends do appear to diverge for the
share of corn. We conduct hypothesis tests for equality of growth trends in
ethanol and non-ethanol counties, or whether c1¼ c2. We cannot reject the
hypothesis of similar growth (st) rates for the share of re-enrollment in etha-
nol and non-ethanol counties from 2001 to 2004. This strengthens the case
for use of share re-enrollment as our key dependent variable. However,
based on an F-test we reject the hypothesis of similar growth rates for corn
share from 2002–2004. While not shown, we conduct the same test using to-
tal corn acres as a dependent variable and find the same result for the share
of corn, rejecting the hypothesis of similar growth rates for 2002–2004.
Our main variable of interest does not violate the parallel trends assump-
tion, but we find that it was violated for corn intensification and total corn
acres. This suggests that ethanol plants were locating in counties that were
experiencing higher growth in corn intensification and production before
the mandate came into effect. Overall, this analysis finds no issue with our
approach for CRP enrollment, and points to the CRP design changes dis-
cussed above as driving our results.
The lack of a parallel trend for corn intensification and production does
raise some broader concerns for the literature on ethanol plant location and
production decisions. If corn production was growing more rapidly in areas
where ethanol plants were built or expanded, there may be a spurious corre-
lation between the ethanol mandate and production decisions. Due to the
time trend, this correlation might not be addressed by including location
fixed effects or even detailed parcel characteristics. This could even be an is-
sue in studies that use an instrumental variables approach, if the instrumen-
tal variable is time-invariant and interacted with time effects, such as in
Motamed et al. (2016). Other studies such as Brown et al. (2014) and
Blomendahl et al. (2011) do not directly address the issue of pre-trends.
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However, the triple differences approach of Towe and Tra (2013) provides
an example of an approach that accounts for this source of bias. While not
disproving the results of previous studies, this finding illustrates a common
issue that should be addressed or discussed as a limitation of studies that
consider ethanol plant location and various production decisions.
Robustness to Local Basis Shifts
While our empirical model controls for national commodity price shifts,
we cannot explicitly account for local prices changes that could potentially
be related to CRP decisions. In addition to this data not being readily avail-
able, it would be difficult to account for the potential endogeneity of CRP
re-enrollment decisions and local price shifts. While we do not know of any
Figure 2 Time trends by ethanol status
Note: Year-ethanol plant coefﬁcients (c1 and c2) from estimation of equation (3).
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other general local basis shifter other than ethanol capacity (i.e., Hart
(2015)), for which we explicitly control, we cannot disprove the presence of
other more idiosyncratic local basis shifts. We address this in a few ways.
We first estimate a “naı¨ve” regression with state-level corn prices, the most
granular level that is publicly available. While our results do not change, in
this specification (table 6) we do not fully control for more local price
changes or address the potential endogeniety of state prices.
We next estimate our model from 2006–2009, with the perspective that
this shorter period may be less likely to have experienced idiosyncratic local
price changes. Even in this short period, we see similar results to our main
specification, which also points to the overall robustness of our findings.
While we cannot control for local price shifts, cropland cash rental rates are
publicly available for our study area from 2008. Given that price shifts are
reflected in cash rents but often with a short lag, the trend in cash rents from
2008–2014 provides an indicator of any relative local price changes that may
have occurred post-mandate. We stratify our sample by above and below
median rental rate trends and find results that are consistent with our main
specification. While we cannot disprove that there are local price shifts that
might be influencing our findings, the above discussed robustness checks
suggest little evidence for this.
Conclusion
Several studies find that ethanol plant location is associated with land use
changes at both the extensive and intensive margins. This study considers the
impact of ethanol plant capacity on CRP re-enrollment decisions before and af-
ter the ethanol mandate. We generally find no relationship between county-
level CRP re-enrollment decisions and ethanol capacity when county and time
fixed effects are included. We also find that less land in ethanol-intensive areas
left the CRP after the mandate, which is likely explained by CRP design
changes that occurred around the same time as the ethanol mandate.
Table 6 Ethanol Capacity and CRP-reenrollment—Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
State
prices
2006-09
only
Below median
rental increase
Above median
rental increase
Ethanol capacity 9.67e-05 0.000538 0.000411 0.00118
(0.000601) (0.000564) (0.000378) (0.00143)
Post 2007*Ethanol
Capacity
0.00131*** 0.00102** 0.00152*** 0.000824***
(0.000235) (0.000418) (0.000392) (0.000230)
Constant 0.745** 0.383 0.628*** 0.673***
(0.355) (0.243) (0.0800) (0.0431)
Observations 7,177 2,827 4,385 3,581
R-squared 0.065 0.017 0.072 0.077
Number of counties 838 823 456 384
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include county population, year ﬁxed effects and oil and gas production. Asterisks denote the follow-
ing: ***¼ p<0.01, **¼ p<0.05, and *¼ p<0.1.
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Our finding of less CRP land leaving the program in ethanol-intensive
areas is robust across a number of restrictive specifications, including the
following: counties outside of Illinois and Iowa; counties with different cash
rental rate growth, which proxies for local basis shifts; and in counties with
different average soil quality. However, we find no effect in counties with
larger or above-median CRP parcel size. This finding suggests that ethanol-
intensive areas had CRP parcels that were more suitable for entry into con-
tinuous CRP and were less likely to leave the program during the crop price
boom after the ethanol mandate went into effect. Parcel size may also be re-
lated to the environmental benefits score, which would have led to higher
eligibility for REX, or automatic re-enrollment or extension contracts offered
for parcels expiring between 2007–2010. Our findings are also consistent
with higher transactions costs for transitioning CRP land to production and
preferences for environmental benefits. While less definitive, indicators of
these factors are more prevalent in counties with ethanol plants.
Given the broader importance of CRP policy changes and land use change
(Hendricks and Er 2018), this study illustrates the importance of accounting
for CRP policies in studies considering ethanol plant location. Our findings
also suggest some limitations to studies using ethanol plant location. As a
part of robustness checks for our empirical strategy, we found that while the
parallel trends assumption is not violated for our main variable of interest—
CRP re-enrollment—it is violated for corn intensification as well as total
corn acreage. Counties with higher levels of ethanol production capacity
had more rapid corn production growth on both the intensive and extensive
margins before the ethanol mandate went into effect. This finding implies
that caution is warranted when using ethanol plant location as an identifica-
tion strategy when analyzing production decisions. Ethanol plant location is
not only associated with access to transportation networks and higher levels
of corn production, but also occurred in areas where corn production was
growing more rapidly well before the mandate went into effect. Researchers
analyzing the local impacts of ethanol plant location and the mandate may
want to consider that local production trends, especially corn intensification,
may violate identification assumptions implicit in such studies. This corn in-
tensification trend may also be an interesting topic for future work.
Several million acres of CRP left the program after 2007, and at least some of
this is most likely due to a biofuel policy-driven increase in agricultural com-
modity prices (de Gorter et al. 2015). While not disproving intensive or exten-
sive land use change as a response to the ethanol mandate, these results
support general price effects as drivers of land use change as opposed to etha-
nol plant location. CRP enrollment decisions have important implications for
land use and hence agricultural and environmental policy, and CRP design
changes appear to have affected behavior more than any local benefits of etha-
nol plants. In general, caution is warranted when interpreting results from the
analysis of the impact of ethanol plant location on production decisions.
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